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BALANCING ACT: FINDING CONSENSUS 
ON STANDARDS FOR UNMASKING 
ANONYMOUS INTERNET SPEAKERS 
Abstract: The growth in popular use of the internet has led to a dramatic 
increase in both the amount of anonymous speech and the number of ag-
grieved plaintiffs claiming to be harmed by it. Lawsuits involving anony-
mous internet speech present thorny questions for courts because plain-
tiffs typically must obtain the identity of anonymous speakers during 
discovery before any adjudication of the underlying claim. Compelled dis-
closure of identifying information thus risks chilling speech by subjecting 
anonymous speakers who have done nothing illegal to unwarranted har-
assment and retaliation. In response to these concerns, courts have formu-
lated “unmasking” standards for determining when to allow anonymous 
speakers to be identified. This Note examines trends within various un-
masking standards and proposes a single standard for future courts that 
requires notice, an evaluation on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, and a 
balancing of the First Amendment rights of the anonymous speaker 
against the strength of the plaintiff’s claim and the need for unmasking. 
Introduction 
 The First Amendment protects the right to speak anonymously.1 
This right derives from the principle that to ensure a vibrant market-
place of ideas, some speakers must be allowed to withhold their identi-
ties to protect themselves from harassment and persecution.2 As Justice 
John Paul Stevens has noted, “[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny 
of the majority.”3 But what happens when anonymous speakers are ac-
cused of harming others with their speech? 
 The right to speak anonymously is not absolute.4 Plaintiffs have the 
right to seek redress for legally cognizable speech and speakers cannot 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 160, 166–67 
(2002); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 199–200 (1999); 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 
U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960). Throughout this Note, the word “anonymous” refers to speech pub-
lished both anonymously and under pseudonyms. 
2 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341–43, 357; Talley, 362 U.S. at 64–65. 
3 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357. 
4 See id. at 353; Doe I v. Individuals (AutoAdmit.com), 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 (D. 
Conn. 2008); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 441 (Md. 2009). 
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escape liability simply by publishing anonymously.5 For example, a poli-
tician may sue for defamation if anonymous speakers harm his reputa-
tion by posting false, damaging comments about him online.6 Similarly, 
corporations may file defamation claims or other appropriate causes of 
action against parties who post false, damaging information online 
about their business practices.7 
 The difficulty with anonymous internet speech lawsuits is that they 
bring plaintiffs’ rights to seek redress into conflict with defendants’ 
rights to speak anonymously during discovery and before adjudication 
of plaintiffs’ claims.8 After filing their claims, plaintiffs must typically 
obtain the identity of anonymous speakers to proceed with litigation, 
which is usually accomplished by filing a discovery subpoena with an 
Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) or website host.9 But if plaintiffs can 
unmask anonymous speakers simply by filing cognizable claims and dis-
covery subpoenas, speakers who have done or would do nothing illegal 
but who wish to remain anonymous may be harassed or intimidated into 
silence.10 For example, what if the alleged defamatory statements about 
our hypothetical politician were merely criticisms of leadership style or a 
pejorative misspelling of his last name and a statement that he was 
“paranoid”?11 Similarly, what if the alleged defamatory statements about 
our hypothetical corporation were postings on an internet financial chat 
board criticizing the company’s accounting practices following several 
public reports about those accounting practices, and suggesting that the 
                                                                                                                      
5 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 254; Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 
F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005). 
6 See, e.g., Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454 (suing anonymous poster of comments to Delaware 
State News website for defamation of town councilor). 
7 See, e.g., Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 944–45 (D.C. 2009) (suing anonymous de-
fendant who reported alleged illegal business activities for defamation and tortious inter-
ference with business opportunities of corporate plaintiff); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 
3, 775 A.2d 756, 760, 762–63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (suing anonymous defen-
dant, who posted comments about the plaintiff company’s accounting practices and possi-
ble sale on financial chat boards, for defamation and trade secret misappropriation). 
8 See, e.g., AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 250–52; Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 
712, 715–16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454–55; see also Ashley I. Kissinger & 
Katharine Larsen, Shielding Jane & John: Can the Media Protect Anonymous Online Speech?, 26 
Comm. Law., July 2009, at 4, 4; Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Dis-
course in Cyberspace, 49 Duke L.J. 855, 858 n.6 (2000); Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John 
Doe” Defendants: The Case Against Excessive Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 Or. L. Rev. 
795, 859 (2004). 
9 See, e.g., AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 250–52; Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 715–16; Cahill, 
884 A.2d at 454–55. 
10 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 254; Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 578; Cahill, 884 
A.2d at 457. 
11 See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454. 
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company was being “shopped” to potential buyers?12 Should such plain-
tiffs be allowed to unmask their anonymous critics or use the threat of a 
lawsuit to intimidate them into silence?13 Making it too easy for plaintiffs 
to unmask anonymous speakers could have a significant chilling effect 
on free speech.14 
 Most courts in the past decade have recognized the First Amend-
ment issues raised by these cases and agree that unmasking requests 
require a balancing of interests between defendants’ rights to speak 
anonymously and plaintiffs’ rights to seek redress for harmful speech.15 
There is less agreement, however, about how to conduct this balanc-
ing.16 Courts have formulated a variety of unmasking standards that 
plaintiffs seeking the identity of anonymous speakers must satisfy be-
fore compelling discovery.17 
 This Note examines unmasking standards in anonymous internet 
speech cases and argues for a single proposed standard to be used by 
all courts.18 Part I examines the right to speak anonymously, including 
the history of anonymous speech and the U.S. Supreme Court’s recog-
nition of the right to speak anonymously.19 Part II explores anonymous 
speech on the internet, including the various contexts and causes of 
action under which requests to unmask anonymous speakers arise, as 
well as the First Amendment issues raised by those cases.20 Part III ana-
lyzes unmasking standards formulated by courts in the past decade.21 It 
identifies key areas of consensus among ten different standards, includ-
ing provisions that require plaintiffs to provide notice of unmasking 
subpoenas to anonymous defendants, as well as provisions requiring 
                                                                                                                      
12 See Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 762–63. 
13 According to the Supreme Court of Delaware in the 2005 case Doe 1 v. Cahill and the 
New Jersey Superior Court in the 2001 case Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, the an-
swer is no. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 467–68 (denying plaintiff’s request to unmask and dis-
missing case with prejudice); Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 772 (affirming lower court’s denial of 
unmasking). 
14 See Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2001); Mobi-
lisa, 170 P.3d at 720; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457. 
15 See infra note 88. 
16 See infra notes 102–180 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 102–103 and accompanying text; see also infra app. 
18 See infra notes 102–220 and accompanying text; see also infra app. This Note focuses 
on standards for unmasking anonymous internet speakers and does not include unmask-
ing opinions related to file sharing. For a discussion of the speech implications of file shar-
ing and a file sharing unmasking opinion, see Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. 
Supp. 2d 556, 562–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
19 See infra notes 25–48 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 49–101 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 102–180 and accompanying text. 
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that plaintiffs make an evidentiary showing on the merits of the claim 
and the need for the identifying information.22 It also identifies the 
main area of disagreement among courts, namely whether a further 
balancing of plaintiffs’ rights to seek redress and defendants’ First 
Amendment interests are needed.23 Part IV proposes a single unmask-
ing standard for future courts that requires notice, an evaluation on the 
merits of the plaintiff’s claim, and a balancing of the First Amendment 
rights of the anonymous speaker against the strength of the plaintiff’s 
claim and the need for unmasking.24 
I. The Right to Speak Anonymously 
A. The Value of Anonymous Speech 
 Anonymous speech has played a key role throughout the course of 
human history and in the founding of the United States.25 As Justice 
Black noted, “[p]ersecuted groups and sects from time to time through-
out history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws ei-
ther anonymously or not at all.”26 Anonymous books and pamphlets 
were frequently used to criticize the British government in pre-
Revolutionary England.27 In the colonies, Revolutionary-era writings like 
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense were published anonymously to protect 
the authors from retribution by the British government.28 Both the Fed-
eralist Papers and responses from anti-federalists were also published un-
der pseudonyms.29 Likewise, the First Amendment itself was, in part, a 
reaction to the licensing laws of England that were intended to stifle 
                                                                                                                      
22 See infra notes 102–148 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 149–180 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 181–220 and accompanying text. 
25 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–43 (1995); Talley v. Cali-
fornia, 362 U.S. 60, 62 n.3, 64–65 (1960); Jennifer B. Wieland, Note, Death of Publius: To-
ward a World Without Anonymous Speech, 17 J.L. & Pol. 589, 590–93 (2001). 
26 Talley, 362 U.S. at 64. 
27 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342; Talley, 362 U.S. at 64–65; Wieland, supra note 25, at 591. 
28 See Talley, 362 U.S. at 62 n.3; Wieland, supra note 25, at 591–92; see also McIntyre, 514 
U.S. at 342–43. 
29 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342–43; Talley, 362 U.S. at 65; Wieland, supra note 25, at 592. 
The Federalist Papers were published under the name “Publius” but were authored by James 
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343 n.6; Wieland, 
supra note 25, at 592. Anti-federalists also published under pseudonyms, including “Cato,” 
“Centinel,” “The Federal Farmer,” and “Brutus.” See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343 n.6; Wieland, 
supra note 25, at 592. 
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criticism of the government by requiring authors to identify themselves 
in their publications.30 
 The value of anonymous speech is not limited to the political 
arena, either.31 Many literary and artistic figures have published under 
pseudonyms, including notable figures like Samuel Langhorne Clemens 
(Mark Twain) and Benjamin Franklin, who published under a variety of 
pseudonyms.32 Sometimes authors publish anonymously by choice, but 
often it is out of necessity, as with many female authors of the nineteenth 
century including Amandine Aurore Lucie Dupin (George Sand) and 
Mary Ann Evans (George Eliot).33 As Justice Black has noted, “[i]t is 
plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most con-
structive purposes.”34 Anonymous speech allows the dissenting, the dis-
enfranchised, and the disempowered to air their views while protecting 
them from retaliation and persecution.35 
B. Recognition of the Right to Speak Anonymously 
 The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the right to speak 
anonymously in its 1960 decision, Talley v. California.36 In Talley, the 
Court struck down a Los Angeles city ordinance making it illegal to dis-
tribute handbills unless the handbills identified the people who created 
and disseminated them.37 Citing the rich history of anonymous speech 
in America and elsewhere, the Court held that the city’s identification 
requirements restricted freedom of expression and that identification 
of parties who voiced unpopular opinions might deter discussion of 
matters of public importance.38 
 Thirty-five years later, the Supreme Court again recognized the 
right to speak anonymously in, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.39 
Striking down an Ohio statute prohibiting the distribution of anony-
mous campaign literature, the Court wrote that an author’s decision to 
                                                                                                                      
30 See Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 1049–53 (5th ed. 2005); see 
also McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342; Talley, 362 U.S. at 64–65. 
31 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341–42; see also Robert J. Griffin, Introduction to The Faces 
of Anonymity: Anonymous & Pseudonymous Publication from the Sixteenth to 
the Twentieth Century 1, 1–15 (Robert J. Griffin ed., 2003). 
32 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341 n.4. 
33 See id. 
34 Talley, 362 U.S. at 65. 
35 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341–43; Talley, 362 U.S. at 64–65. 
36 See 362 U.S. at 64–65. 
37 Id. at 60–61, 65. 
38 See id. at 64–65. 
39 See 514 U.S. at 342. 
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remain anonymous was “an aspect of the freedom of speech protected 
by the First Amendment.”40 The Court again cited the rich historical 
tradition of anonymous advocacy and dissent, noting that anonymity 
helped shield unpopular individuals and ideas from retaliation and 
suppression.41 Regardless of whether the motivation for seeking ano-
nymity was privacy or fear of harassment, the Court wrote that the in-
terest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas out-
weighed the public’s interest in knowing authors’ identities.42 The 
Court also noted that that although the right to remain anonymous 
might be abused, the value of free speech generally outweighed these 
concerns.43 
 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the right to speak anonymously in 
its 1999 decision, Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, and 
in its 2002 decision, Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village of Stratton.44 
In Buckley, the Court overturned a Colorado law requiring the identifi-
cation of the names of all initiative petition circulators.45 The Court 
noted that petition circulators had a strong interest in remaining 
anonymous, particularly when canvassing in areas where people might 
be unreceptive to their ideas.46 Similarly, in Watchtower Bible, the Court 
struck down a local ordinance requiring individuals to obtain permits 
before engaging in door-to-door advocacy.47 The right to speak anony-
mously was among the various speech rights cited by the Court as 
weighing against the ordinance.48 
                                                                                                                      
40 See id. at 336, 342, 357. 
41 See id. at 341–43, 357. 
42 See id. at 341–42. In a footnote, the Court quoted New York case law, stating: 
Don’t underestimate the common man. People are intelligent enough to 
evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. They can see it is anonymous. 
They know it is anonymous. They can evaluate its anonymity along with its 
message, as long as they are permitted, as they must be, to read that message. 
And then, once they have done so, it is for them to decide what is responsible, 
what is valuable, and what is truth. 
Id. at 348 n.11 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
43 See id. at 357. 
44 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 160, 166–69 
(2002); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 198–200, 204 (1999). 
45 Buckley, 525 U.S. at 186–87, 204. 
46 See id. at 199–200, 204. 
47 536 U.S. at 153–55, 164, 169. The Court found the ordinance was overly broad and 
insufficiently tailored to serve the claimed interests of protecting residents’ privacy as well 
as preventing fraud and crime. See id. at 164–69. 
48 Id. at 166–67. 
2010] Finding Consensus on Standards for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers 839 
II. Anonymous Speech on the Internet 
 Speech on the internet receives full First Amendment protection, 
including the right to speak anonymously.49 But the right to speak 
anonymously is not absolute, and plaintiffs have the right to seek re-
dress for harmful anonymous speech.50 Lawsuits involving anonymous 
internet speakers, however, raise novel problems for courts, particularly 
in the area of unmasking.51 
A. Anonymous Internet Speech Unmasking Cases 
 Anonymous internet speech cases arise in a variety of contexts and 
under various causes of action.52 Most cases involve claims filed against 
unknown defendants53 for items posted anonymously to websites,54 but 
                                                                                                                      
49 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); Doe I v. Individuals (AutoAdmit.com), 
561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 253–54 (D. Conn. 2008); Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 
2005). 
50 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 353 (1995); AutoAdmit.com, 
561 F. Supp. 2d at 254; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 456. 
51 See infra notes 52–81 and accompanying text. 
52 See infra notes 53–72 and accompanying text. 
53 Sometimes websites or other known parties are also sued. See, e.g., Indep. Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 442–47 (Md. 2009) (suing newspaper and anonymous users of 
newspaper’s website discussion forums for content posted by the users); see also Kissinger & 
Larsen, supra note 8, at 4. Anonymous speech cases may also involve requests to unmask 
anonymous third parties. See, e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089–90 
(W.D. Wash. 2001) (seeking the identities of anonymous posters to financial internet chat 
rooms as part of corporate executives’ affirmative defense in a shareholder fraud lawsuit). 
54 See, e.g., Sinclair v. TubeSockTedD, 596 F. Supp. 2d 128, 130–31 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(comments about and responses to plaintiff’s video posted on YouTube); Quixtar Inc. v. 
Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1206, 1208–09 (D. Nev. 2008) (content 
on websites allegedly intended to lure away plaintiff’s business partners); AutoAdmit.com, 
561 F. Supp. 2d at 250–52 (comments about female Yale Law school students including 
threats and sexually violent fantasies posted to the website www.AutoAdmit.com); McMann 
v. Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d 259, 261–62 (D. Mass. 2006) (content of website alleging misdeal-
ings by plaintiff developer); Best Western Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 
2006 WL 2091695, at *1–3 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006) (content on website formed by member 
owners devoted to airing views and issues related to plaintiff member corporation); Alvis 
Coatings, Inc. v. Does 1 Through 10, No. 3L94 CV 374-H, 2004 WL 2904405, at *1, 
(W.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 2004) (comments posted on several websites regarding plaintiff corpo-
ration and its products); SPX Corp. v. Doe, 253 F. Supp. 2d 974, 976–77 (N.D. Ohio 2003) 
(comments regarding plaintiff corporation posted to financial website); In re Baxter, No. 
01-00026-M, 2001 WL 34806203, at *1, *13–15 (W.D. La. Dec. 20, 2001) (articles about 
plaintiff university vice president posted to website); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 
234–35 (Ct. App. 2008) (comments about plaintiff corporate executive posted on financial 
website); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454 (comments about plaintiff politician posted on newspaper 
website blog forum); Brodie, 966 A.2d at 442–47 (comments about local businessman 
posted on a newspaper website); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (comments about plaintiff corporation posted on financial web-
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anonymous speakers have also been sued for using corporate names as 
online pseudonyms,55 for registering internet domain names of trade-
marked corporations,56 for reporting suspected illegal corporate activi-
ties to a trade industry website,57 and for sending emails and other elec-
tronic communications.58 Plaintiffs are most commonly corporations or 
companies,59 but also include private individuals,60 business people and 
corporate executives,61 and public figures.62 
 The primary cause of action in most anonymous speech lawsuits is 
defamation or another speech-related tort claim, frequently combined 
with other causes of action, such as breach of contract, copyright viola-
tions, trademark violations, property claims, tortious interference with 
business relations, and miscellaneous statutory violations.63 Anonymous 
speakers are also sometimes sued without a speech-related tort claim.64 
                                                                                                                      
site); Greenbaum v. Google, Inc., 845 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (blog posts about 
plaintiff school board member); Reunion Indus. Inc. v. Doe 1, 80 Pa. D. & C.4th 449, 450 
(Com. Pl. 2007) (comments about plaintiff corporation on financial website); Klehr Harri-
son Harvey Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v. JPA Dev., Inc., No. 0425, 2006 WL 37020, at *1–2 
(Pa. Com. Pl. Jan. 4, 2006) (comments about plaintiff lawyers posted on websites); In re 
Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (blog posts about plaintiff hospital); 
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc. (AOL), 52 Va. Cir. 26, 26–27 (Cir. Ct. 
2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 
542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001) (comments and information about plaintiff corporation posted 
in internet chat rooms). 
55 See Highfields Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969, 970–72 (N.D. Cal. 
2005). 
56 See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 575–76 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
57 See Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 944–45 (D.C. 2009). 
58 See Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 715 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (suing anonymous 
defendants for forwarding plaintiff CEO’s private email along with anonymous comments to 
third parties); Polito v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 78 Pa. D. & C.4th 328, 329 (Com. Pl. 2004) 
(suing anonymous defendant for sending harassing emails and instant messages). 
59 See, e.g., Quixtar, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 1206; Best Western Int’l, 2006 WL 2091695 at *1, 
*3; Highfields Capital, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 970; Alvis Coatings, Inc., 2004 WL 2904405, at *1; 
SPX Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d at 976; Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 575; Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 715; 
Solers, 977 A.2d at 944; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760; Reunion Indus., 80 Pa. D. & C.4th at 450; 
Klehr Harrison, 2006 WL 37020, at *1; AOL, 52 Va. Cir. at 26. 
60 See, e.g., Sinclair, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 130 (plaintiff private citizen who posted self-
made video to YouTube); AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 250–51 (plaintiff Yale Law 
School students); Polito, 78 Pa. D. & C.4th at 329 (plaintiff private citizen). 
61 See, e.g., McMann, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (real estate developer); Krinsky, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 234–35 (company president); Brodie, 966 A.2d at 442 (businessman). 
62 See, e.g., Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454 (plaintiff town councilor); Greenbaum, 845 N.Y.S.2d at 
697 (plaintiff school board member); see also Baxter, 2001 WL 34806203 at *1, *13–14 
(plaintiff university vice president whom the court found to be a public official). 
63 See, e.g., Sinclair, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 130 (defamation and reckless misrepresenta-
tion); AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 252 (libel, invasion of privacy, negligent and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and copyright violations); McMann, 460 F. Supp. 2d 
at 262 (defamation, privacy, and copyright violations); Best Western Int’l, 2006 WL 2091695, 
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 Lawsuits involving anonymous speakers may also involve a wide 
variety of speech.65 Topics include everything from commentary on 
public affairs and public figures,66 to statements about corporations, 
corporate officials and commercial activities,67 to comments about pri-
vate or semi-private individuals.68 The subject may be a matter of public 
record or public importance, or it may relate to more private or per-
sonal matters.69 The speech may also contain comments that arguably 
                                                                                                                      
at *1 (defamation, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, revealing confidential 
information, trademark infringement, and unfair competition); Highfields Capital, 385 F. 
Supp. 2d at 971 (defamation, commercial disparagement, and trademark violations); Alvis 
Coatings, 2004 WL 2904405, at *1 (defamation, Lanham Act violations, deceptive and un-
fair trade practices, unfair competition, and tortious interference with business relations); 
SPX Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d at 977 (defamation); Baxter, 2001 WL 34806203, at *1 (defama-
tion); Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 235 (libel and interference with contractual and business 
employment relationships); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454 (defamation and invasion of privacy 
claims); Solers, 977 A.2d at 944 (defamation and tortious interference with business oppor-
tunities); Brodie, 966 A.2d at 442 (defamation and conspiracy to defame); Dendrite, 775 
A.2d at 760 (defamation); Greenbaum, 845 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (defamation); Reunion Indus., 80 
Pa. D. & C.4th at 450 (commercial disparagement); Klehr Harrison, 2006 WL 37020, at *1 
(defamation and civil conspiracy); In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d at 810 (defamation and 
disclosure of confidential patient information); AOL, 52 Va. Cir. at 26–27 (defamation, 
publication of confidential insider information, breach of fiduciary duties, and breach of 
contract). For a discussion of the First Amendment implications of trade secret lawsuits, 
see Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is It Time to Restrain the Plain-
tiffs?, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1425 (2009). 
64 See, e.g., Quixtar, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 1206 (Lanham Act violations, trade secret misap-
propriation, and tortious interference with contracts and business relations); Seescandy.com, 
185 F.R.D. at 576 (trademark infringement and dilution, unfair competition, deceptive 
trade practices, and unjust enrichment); Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 715–16 (trespass to chattel 
and violations of federal electronic communications law); Polito, 78 Pa. D. & C.4th at 329, 
343, 345 (harassment and stalking). 
65 See infra notes 66–72 and accompanying text. 
66 See, e.g., Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454 (comments regarding mayor and town councilor’s 
leadership styles and efforts to revitalize town); Brodie, 966 A.2d at 442–44 (comments on 
newspaper website forum regarding sale of historic home and subsequent fire that de-
stroyed it); Greenbaum, 845 N.Y.S.2d at 699–700 (postings regarding school board member 
on blog devoted to community issues in Long Island, NY). 
67 See, e.g., Solers, 977 A.2d at 944–45 (anonymous defendant reported alleged illegal 
corporate activities to a trade industry association website); Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 762–63 
(comments about corporation’s accounting practices, structuring of contracts, and the 
possibility that company was being “shopped” for sale); In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d at 810 
(comments regarding hospital and hospital administration and staff on blog). 
68 See, e.g., Sinclair, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 130–31 (comments regarding video maker who 
posted video to YouTube); AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 250–52 (comments regarding 
Yale Law School students); Polito, 78 Pa. D. & C.4th at 329 (emails and instant messages 
sent to private individual). 
69 See supra notes 66–68. The line for what speech relates to public matters and private 
matters is often blurred, particularly within the corporate arena. See, e.g., Mobilisa, 170 P.3d 
at 715 (anonymous defendant forwarded intimate email written by CEO of company ask-
ing: “Is this a company you want to work for?”); Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 234–35 (calling 
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could be either statements of fact or opinions,70 and personal attacks 
ranging from name calling71 to full-scale campaigns of harassment.72 
 Because federal law largely immunizes website owners and ISPs 
for content posted online by third parties, plaintiffs typically must sue 
the anonymous individuals who posted the offending materials di-
rectly.73 After filing claims, plaintiffs must file discovery subpoenas 
seeking identifying information from ISPs or websites to proceed with 
the litigation.74 
                                                                                                                      
management at company “boobs, losers and crooks” and insulting plaintiff corporate 
president). 
70 See, e.g., SPX Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d at 976–77 (comments on financial chat board al-
leging fraud, “cooking the books,” and overleveraging, and warning “[g]et ready for and 
[sic] SEC and FBI Probe” (bracket in the original)); Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 762–63 (com-
ments on financial chat board that corporate plaintiff’s executives were changing account-
ing practices to enhance revenues and attempting to sell the company); see also Lidsky, 
supra note 8, at 932–46 (arguing in favor of adapting opinion privilege doctrines for 
anonymous internet speech cases given the context and hyperbolic tenor of most anony-
mous internet speech). 
71 See, e.g., Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 235 (calling corporate management “boobs, los-
ers and crooks” and saying plaintiff had “fat thighs, a fake medical degree, ‘queefs’ and . . . 
poor feminine hygiene”); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454 (calling politician “paranoid” and mis-
spelling last name as “Gahill”); Greenbaum, 845 N.Y.S.2d at 699–700 (calling school board 
member a “bigot”). 
72 See, e.g., AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 250–52 (subjecting plaintiffs, female Yale 
Law School students, to hundreds of postings by users of the website www.AutoAdmit.com 
ranging from insults to threats and sexually violent fantasies); see also Polito, 78 Pa. D. & 
C.4th at 329, 343, 345 (harassment and stalking claims in case involving unknown indi-
viduals who sent plaintiff harassing emails and instant messages). For more details on the 
AutoAdmit case, see David Margolick, Slimed Online, Portfolio, Mar. 2009, at 80. 
73 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). Section 230 states: “No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.” Id. § 230(c)(1). Courts have interpreted this provi-
sion broadly, holding that it largely shields ISPs and website operators from liability for con-
tent posted independently online by third parties. See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 
339 F.3d 1119, 1120–25 (9th Cir. 2003); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–35 (4th 
Cir. 1997); cf. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162–76 (9th Cir. 
2008) (website held responsible for third party content when it was directly involved in shap-
ing that content). Claims are, however, sometimes filed against websites or ISPs, either sepa-
rately or in addition to anonymous defendants. See Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 8, at 4; see 
also supra note 53. 
74 See Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 8, at 4; Margo E. K. Reder & Christine Neylon 
O’Brien, Corporate Cybersmear: Employers File John Doe Defamation Lawsuits Seeking the Identity of 
Anonymous Employee Internet Posters, 8 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 195, 197 (2002); 
David L. Sobel, The Process that “John Doe” Is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge to Internet 
Anonymity, 5 Va. J.L. & Tech. 3, ¶ 14 (2000), http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/symposium/ 
v5i1a3-Sobel.html; Shaun B. Spencer, CyberSLAPP Suits and John Doe Subpoenas: Balancing 
Anonymity and Accountability in Cyberspace, 19 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 493, 
495–96 (2001); Vogel, supra note 8, at 802–03. 
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 The procedural posture of these unmasking subpoenas presents 
several difficulties for courts.75 First, the subpoenas are frequently 
served on third party ISPs or websites who sometimes do not contest the 
subpoenas or notify anonymous speakers about them.76 Anonymous 
speakers thus may have no chance to contest the release of identifying 
information.77 
 Second, and more substantively, unmasking subpoenas are filed 
during discovery at a stage in the litigation where claims have not been 
adjudicated and the record is often underdeveloped, particularly in 
notice pleading jurisdictions.78 If anonymous speakers can be un-
masked simply by filing cognizable claims and discovery subpoenas, 
plaintiffs may intimidate or silence critics who have done or would do 
nothing illegal but who wish to remain anonymous or avoid costly liti-
gation.79 Umasking may also be the primary remedy sought by plaintiffs 
and may subject anonymous defendants to extra-judicial retaliation.80 
                                                                                                                      
75 See infra notes 76–81 and accompanying text. 
76 See 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 n.5 (discussing the problems of notice for 
anonymous internet speakers); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What 
Can We Learn from John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1373, 1374 (2009); Reder & O’Brien, supra 
note 74, at 197; Sobel, supra note 74, ¶ 14; Spencer, supra note 74, at 495–96; Vogel, supra 
note 8, at 802–03. 
77 See cases and articles cited supra note 76. The issue of notice has been mitigated 
somewhat over time both by increased judicial scrutiny of unmasking subpoenas and by 
increased willingness of ISPs and websites to protect their customers’ privacy. See Kissinger 
& Larsen, supra note 8, at 4; Vogel, supra note 8, at 812–13, 853–54. Federal law also man-
dates that cable ISPs must receive a court order and provide notice to their subscribers 
before disclosing identifying information to a third party. See 47 U.S.C. § 551(c) (2006); see 
also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 
82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1537, 1598 (2007). This law, however, does not cover non-cable 
ISPs or other web entities, and notice remains a significant issue in cases involving anony-
mous internet defendants. See Lidsky & Cotter, supra, at 1598 (arguing to broaden notice 
protections for anonymous defendants beyond the current scope of 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)). 
78 See, e.g., Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 715–16, 720; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454–55, 458; Dendrite, 
775 A.2d at 760–64. 
79 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 254; Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 578; Cahill, 884 
A.2d at 457; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 771. 
80 See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457; see also Lidsky, supra note 8, at 876–83, 887–92; Megan M. 
Sunkel, Note, And the I(SP)s Have It . . . But How Does One Get It? Examining the Lack of Standards 
for Ruling on Subpoenas Seeking to Reveal the Identity of Anonymous Internet Users in Claims of Online 
Defamation, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1189, 1195 (2003). For example, in one well-documented case, 
Raytheon Co. sued twenty-one anonymous posters to a Yahoo! website alleging they had re-
vealed confidential information about the company. See Jennifer O’Brien, Note, Putting a 
Face to a (Screen) Name: The First Amendment Implications of Compelling ISPs to Reveal the Identities 
of Anonymous Internet Speakers in Online Defamation Cases, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2745, 2771–72 
(2002) (citing Motion to Quash, Raytheon v. Does 1–21, No. 99-816 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 
1999)); see also Sobel, supra note 74, ¶ 15; Caroline E. Strickland, Note, Applying McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Commission to Anonymous Speech on the Internet and the Discovery of John Doe’s 
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Thus, allowing plaintiffs to unmask anonymous defendants too easily 
risks chilling speech by subjecting anonymous speakers to harassment, 
retaliation, or retribution merely for expressing unpopular opinions.81 
B. Evolution of Court Responses to Unmasking Subpoenas 
 As popular use of the internet increased during the 1990s, so too 
did lawsuits involving anonymous internet speakers.82 Early on, courts 
confronted with unmasking subpoenas showed little sensitivity to the 
First Amendment issues raised by these cases, frequently failing to scru-
tinize the subpoenas and often allowing them to proceed with little dis-
cussion on the rare occasions when they were contested.83 
 Many commentators criticized these early unmasking cases, citing 
their potential chilling effect on internet speech.84 Particularly worri-
some for some was what they identified as a rash of strategic lawsuits 
against public participation (“SLAPP-suits”), filed by corporations 
against anonymous online critics.85 
 Over time, courts have shown greater sensitivity to the issues pre-
sented in anonymous speech cases.86 Many courts have recognized that 
the primary concern with unmasking subpoenas is the risk of misuse of 
such subpoenas to harass, intimidate, or otherwise silence critics.87 Most 
                                                                                                                      
Identity, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1537, 1553 (2001). After using discovery subpoenas to iden-
tify posters who turned out to be employees, Raytheon dropped the lawsuit and handled the 
matter internally; this reportedly resulted in several employees leaving the company. See 
O’Brien, supra, at 2772. The confidential information cited by Raytheon in the original com-
plaint turned out to be either false or publicly available knowledge. See Strickland, supra, at 
1553. 
81 See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
82 See Lidsky, supra note 8, at 858 n.6; see also Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane 
and John Doe: Online Anonymity and the First Amendment, 8 Comm. L. & Pol’y 405, 415–17 
(2003); Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 77, at 1594; Reder & O’Brien, supra note 74, at 196–97; 
Sobel, supra note 74, ¶¶ 1–2, 10–17; Spencer, supra note 74, at 493–94; Vogel, supra note 8, 
at 802–03. 
83 See Lidsky, supra note 76, at 1373–74; Lidsky, supra note 8, at 858 n.6; Vogel, supra 
note 8, at 802–03. 
84 See, e.g., Sobel, supra note 74, ¶¶ 15–21; Spencer, supra note 74, at 493–94. 
85 See, e.g., Ekstrand, supra note 82, at 415–17 (commenting on the phenomenon of 
SLAPP suits and noting that in 2003 at least twenty states had anti–SLAPP laws that prohib-
ited plaintiffs from using the legal system to silence opposition and chill free speech); 
Spencer, supra note 74, at 493–96 (coining the word cyber–SLAPP to define strategic law-
suits against public participation aimed at online critics). 
86 See Lidsky, supra note 76, at 1374–84; Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 77, at 1594–98; Vo-
gel, supra note 8, at 810–15. 
87 See, e.g., AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 254; 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 
1092; Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 578; Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 717, 720; Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
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courts have concluded that requests to unmask anonymous internet 
speakers require a balancing of defendants’ rights to speak anonymously 
against plaintiffs’ rights to seek redress for harmful speech.88 The bigger 
question is how to achieve this balancing.89 
C. An Example of an Unmasking Standard 
 Since 1999, many courts have formulated unmasking standards 
that parties seeking the identity of anonymous speakers must satisfy be-
fore allowing unmasking subpoenas to proceed.90 A typical example, 
and one of the earliest standards, comes from the 2001 Superior Court 
of New Jersey case, Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3.91 
 In Dendrite, Dendrite International, Inc. (“Dendrite”) sought to 
compel disclosure of the identities of anonymous defendants who 
posted allegedly defamatory comments about the company and its 
management on a Yahoo! financial website.92 First, the court identified 
its primary concern as balancing defendants’ rights to speak anony-
mously against plaintiffs’ rights to seek redress.93 The court then out-
lined an unmasking standard that required a party seeking to unmask 
an anonymous internet speaker to: 1) demonstrate efforts to provide 
notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the anonymous 
speakers, including posting notification of the court proceedings on the 
website where the comments were made; 2) set forth the exact allegedly 
actionable statements made by each anonymous speaker; and 3) estab-
lish that the cause of action could withstand a motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and also produce 
sufficient evidence for each element of the cause of action on a prima 
facie basis.94 If these three steps were satisfied, then the court was fur-
                                                                                                                      
3d at 238, 245; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457, 459; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 767, 771; AOL, 52 Va. Cir. 
at 34. 
88 See, e.g., AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 254; 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 
1095; Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 578; Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 717; Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
238–39; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 456; Solers, 977 A.2d at 951; Brodie, 966 A.2d at 447, 456; Den-
drite, 775 A.2d at 760; AOL, 52 Va. Cir. at 34–35. 
89 See infra notes 90–180 and accompanying text. 
90 See infra notes 102–103; see also Lidsky, supra note 76, at 1376–84. 
91 775 A.2d at 760–61. 
92 See id. at 760. The defendant criticized Dendrite’s accounting practices, which had 
been the subject of several published reports, and suggested that the company was being 
shopped to potential buyers. See id. at 762–63. Dendrite claimed that the postings caused 
the company’s stock price to fluctuate and “may” have had detrimental effects on the 
company’s ability to hire and retain employees. See id. at 772. 
93 See id. at 760. 
94 See id. 
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ther required to balance the defendant’s First Amendment right of 
anonymous speech against the strength of the prima facie case and the 
necessity for disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity.95 Apply-
ing its standard, the court ultimately concluded that Dendrite had not 
sufficiently stated a prima facie case and denied the motion to compel 
discovery.96 
 Although an influential case, the Dendrite standard is just one of 
many unmasking standards.97 As of 2010, more than twenty courts have 
either promulgated unmasking standards or outlined specific criteria 
that parties seeking to identify anonymous internet speakers must sat-
isfy before compelling discovery.98 These unmasking standards have 
been promulgated primarily at the state and federal district court levels 
and have been formulated on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis, result-
ing in what has been described as an “entire spectrum” or, less charita-
bly, a “morass” of unmasking standards.99 Nevertheless, although there 
is much variation within unmasking standards, there are also significant 
areas of consensus.100 The following Part examines these areas of con-
sensus and disagreement.101 
                                                                                                                      
95 See id. at 760–61. 
96 See id. at 772. The court concluded that Dendrite had not made a prima facie show-
ing of harm, and that, although Dendrite’s discovery request would survive a traditional 
motion to dismiss, it did not survive the new standard. See id. at 771–72. 
97 See infra notes 102–103. Not all courts embrace the use of special standards for 
evaluating unmasking subpoenas, even when those courts recognize the need to balance 
the competing interests of plaintiffs and anonymous defendants. See, e.g., Klehr Harrison, 
2006 WL 37020, at *8–9 (rejecting the implementation of new standards for unmasking 
anonymous internet posters as “likely [to] do more harm than good”); see also Vogel, supra 
note 8, at 841–55 (arguing for the use of existing procedural mechanisms instead of new 
unmasking standards in anonymous internet speech cases). Nevertheless, the clear trend is 
towards using unmasking standards or specific criteria to evaluate unmasking requests. See 
infra notes 102–103. 
98 See infra notes 102–103. 
99 See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457 (“entire spectrum”); Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 77, at 
1598 (“morass”); see also infra notes 102–103. 
100 See infra notes 102–180 and accompanying text; see also Lidsky, supra note 76, at 1376–
84; Sam Bayard, D.C. High Court Joins Consensus Protecting the Anonymity of Online Speakers, Citi-
zen Media L. Project, Aug. 17, 2009, http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2009/dc-high- 
court-joins-consensus-protecting-anonymity-online-speakers. Bayard’s blog is an excellent 
resource for tracking and analyzing the ongoing changes in anonymous internet speech 
cases. See Sam Bayard, Citizen Media Law Project Blog, http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/ 
sam-bayard (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
101 See infra notes 102–180 and accompanying text. 
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III. Consensus and Disagreement Within Standards for 
Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers 
 This Part surveys areas of consensus and disagreement among ten 
different unmasking standards formulated by courts between 1999 and 
2009.102 The cases selected for the survey were chosen both because the 
opinions contain clearly articulated standards allowing for easy com-
parison and also because they are broadly representative of various 
trends in unmasking standards over the past ten years.103 
 This Part concludes that, although the language of different stan-
dards varies widely, there is general agreement that plaintiffs seeking to 
unmask anonymous defendants should first show that they have made 
reasonable attempts to provide defendants with notice and an oppor-
tunity to respond to the unmasking subpoena.104 Courts also agree that 
to balance plaintiffs’ rights to seek redress against defendants’ rights to 
speak anonymously, there should both be an evidentiary showing on 
the merits of the plaintiff’s claim and some showing of need for the 
                                                                                                                      
102 See Doe I v. Individuals (AutoAdmit.com), 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254–56 (D. Conn. 
2008); Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001); Colum-
bia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578–80 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Mobilisa, Inc. v. 
Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244–
45 (Ct. App. 2008); Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460–61 (Del. 2005); Solers, Inc. v. 
Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 954 (D.C. 2009); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 457 
(Md. 2009); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2001); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc. (AOL), 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 
(2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 
542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001). For full text of these unmasking standards, see infra app. 
103 See supra note 102; see also infra app. Many other courts have thoughtfully consid-
ered the issue of unmasking anonymous internet speakers and have either formulated 
unmasking standards or expounded on specific unmasking criteria. See, e.g., Sinclair v. 
TubeSockTedD, 596 F. Supp. 2d 128, 132–34 (D.D.C. 2009); Quixtar Inc. v. Signature 
Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1216 (D. Nev. 2008); McMann v. Doe, 460 F. 
Supp. 2d 259, 266–68 (D. Mass. 2006); Best Western Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-
PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 2091695, at *4–6 (D. Ariz. Jul. 25, 2006); Highfields Capital Mgmt., 
L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969, 970–71 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Alvis Coatings, Inc. v. Does 1 
Through 10, No. 3L94 CV 374-H, 2004 WL 2904405, at *3–4 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 2004); SPX 
Corp. v. Doe, 253 F. Supp. 2d 974, 977–78, 980 (N.D. Ohio2003); In re Baxter, No. 01–
00026-M, 2001 WL 34806203, at *11–12 (W.D. La. Dec. 20, 2001); Greenbaum v. Google, 
Inc., 845 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698–99 (Sup. Ct. 2007); Reunion Indus. Inc. v. Doe 1, 80 Pa. D. & 
C.4th 449, 456 (Com. Pl. 2007); Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v. JPA 
Dev., Inc., No. 0425 March Term 2004, 2006 WL 37020, *8–9 (Pa. Com. Pl. Jan. 4, 2006); 
Polito v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 78 Pa. D. & C.4th 328, 341 (Com. Pl. 2004); In re Does 1–
10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 821–23 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007). Notably, many of these cases utilize simi-
lar factors in evaluating unmasking subpoenas as the cases in this survey and, as such, they 
are referenced throughout this Part. 
104 See infra notes 108–115 and accompanying text. 
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identifying information.105 There is substantially less agreement, how-
ever, about what evidentiary showing is sufficient106 and also about 
other factors courts should consider in balancing plaintiffs’ and defen-
dants’ interests.107 
A. Notice 
 Most unmasking standards in the survey require parties seeking 
the identities of anonymous internet speakers to demonstrate that they 
have made reasonable attempts to provide notice of the unmasking 
subpoenas to the anonymous speakers so the subpoenas may be con-
tested.108 These notice provisions typically require a showing of “ade-
quate notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.”109 These courts 
have indicated that adequate notice may be satisfied in a variety of ways, 
including posting notification of the claim and unmasking subpoena to 
                                                                                                                      
105 See infra notes 116–148 and accompanying text. 
106 See infra notes 122–137 and accompanying text. 
107 See infra notes 149–180 and accompanying text. 
108 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 254 (requiring petitioner to “notify the anony-
mous posters . . . and with[ho]ld action to afford . . . a reasonable opportunity to file and 
serve opposition”); Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579 (requiring petitioner to “identify all pre-
vious steps taken to locate the elusive defendant . . . mak[ing] a good faith effort to comply 
with the requirements of service and process”); Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 721 (requiring petitioner 
to give “adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond”); Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
at 244 (“notify the defendant”); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460–61 (requiring petitioner to “notify the 
anonymous poster . . . [and] withhold action to afford . . . a reasonable opportunity to file 
and serve opposition”); Solers, 977 A.2d at 954 (requiring petitioner to make “reasonable 
efforts to notify the anonymous defendant”); Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457 (requiring petitioner to 
“notify the anonymous posters . . . [and] withhold action to afford . . . a reasonable opportu-
nity to file and serve opposition”); Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760 (requiring petitioner to “notify 
the anonymous posters . . . and withhold action to afford . . . a reasonable opportunity to file 
and serve opposition”); see also infra app. Only two of the ten standards in the survey do not 
explicitly contain notice provisions. See 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1095; AOL, 52 Va. 
Cir. at 37; see also infra app. Notably, these are two of the earliest unmasking decisions in this 
survey, and both also involved contested unmasking subpoenas. See 2TheMart.com, 140 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1088, 1095 (decided in 2001); AOL, 52 Va. Cir. at 26, 37 (decided in 2000). 
Many unmasking opinions outside this survey also require plaintiffs to make a showing 
that they attempted to provide notice to anonymous defendants. See, e.g., Quixtar, 566 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1212–13, 1216–17; Best Western Int’l, 2006 WL 2091695, at *6; Greenbaum, 845 
N.Y.S.2d at 698; see also Polito, 78 Pa. D. & C.4th at 341–42 (requiring the ISP to provide the 
anonymous defendant with notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond before per-
mitting unmasking). 
109 Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 721. Two courts have required only a showing of notice with no 
mention of a reasonable opportunity to respond. See Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579; Krin-
sky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244. 
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the internet forum where the alleged harmful speech occurred, or to 
an email address from which the speech originated.110 
 Courts have cited various rationales for including notice provisions 
in their unmasking standards.111 Many courts have broadly invoked due 
process concerns.112 A few courts have expressed displeasure with ex 
parte proceedings in general.113 Perhaps most importantly, notice is 
desirable on a practical level because it increases the likelihood of ad-
versarial proceedings and encourages a better development of the re-
cord by which courts can evaluate the merits of unmasking request.114 
Regardless of the rationale, almost all unmasking standards in the sur-
vey contain notice provisions.115 
B. Evidentiary Showing on the Merits of the Claim 
 Virtually all unmasking standards in the survey also require some 
evidentiary showing on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.116 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                      
110 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 254; Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579; Mobilisa, 
170 P.3d at 719–20; Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461; Solers, 977 A.2d 
at 954–55; Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760. This can be viewed as a com-
promise position, attempting to provide at least constructive notice for anonymous defen-
dants while not unduly burdening plaintiffs, especially given the malleable and ever-
changing nature of the internet. See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 254; Seescandy.com, 
185 F.R.D. at 579; Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 719–20; Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244; Cahill, 884 
A.2d at 461; Solers, 977 A.2d at 954–55; Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760. 
111 See infra notes 112–114 and accompanying text. 
112 See Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579; Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 719–20; see also supra note 
108; cf. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1091–92, 1095 & n.5 (noting that court orders in 
civil lawsuits constitute state action and as such are subject to constitutional limitations, but 
neglecting to include a notification provision within the umasking standard formulated by 
the court). 
113 See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460–61; see also Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579–80 (express-
ing concern with ex parte proceedings, but discussing another part of its unmasking stan-
dard); Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 770–71 (same). 
114 See supra note 108. 
115 See supra note 108. 
116 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 256 (requiring “a concrete showing as to each 
element of a prima facie case against the defendant”); Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579 (re-
quiring “that plaintiff’s suit . . . could withstand a motion to dismiss”); Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 
721 (requiring that the “cause of action could survive a motion for summary judgment on 
elements not dependent on the speaker’s identity”); Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245 (re-
quiring “a prima facie showing of the elements [of the claim]”); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460 
(requiring “facts sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion [by the defendant]”); 
Solers, 977 A.2d at 954 (requiring “evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on 
each element of the claim [within the plaintiff’s control]”); Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457 (requir-
ing that petitioner “set forth a prima facie [cause of action]”); Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760 
(requiring that petitioner “set forth a prima facie cause of action”); AOL, 52 Va. Cir. at 37 
(requiring pleadings or evidence showing “that the party requesting the subpoena has a 
legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the victim of [actionable conduct]”); 
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this evidentiary showing is the primary factor used by most courts to 
balance the anonymous speech rights of defendants against plaintiffs’ 
rights to pursue redress for harmful speech.117 
 Althought inquiries on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims place an un-
usual evidentiary burden on plaintiffs during discovery, courts have 
justified this burden because of the unusual nature of unmasking re-
quests.118 Courts have noted that requests to unmask anonymous inter-
net speakers constitute “extraordinary application[s] of the discovery 
process,” implicating the First Amendment rights of anonymous par-
ties.119 Likewise, courts have stressed that unmasking subpoenas may 
chill speech by harassing or intimidating anonymous critics who have 
done nothing illegal, or by subjecting anonymous speakers to extra-
judicial retaliation.120 Most courts have thus concluded that they must 
ensure that there is a legitimate factual basis for allowing a party to ob-
tain the identity of an anonymous speaker through an unmasking sub-
poena.121 
 While there is general agreement within unmasking standards that 
some evidentiary evaluation of the plaintiff’s claim is needed, there is 
significantly less agreement as to what evidentiary showing is suffi-
cient.122 Courts have formulated four main tests for evaluating the un-
derlying claim, requiring either: 1) a showing that the claim was brought 
                                                                                                                      
see also infra app.; cf. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (requiring not a showing on the 
merits of the claim, but requiring a showing that the subpoena itself was brought in good 
faith in case where defendant sought to unmask non-party anonymous speaker as part of 
defense). 
117 See supra note 116; see also infra app. For more unmasking opinions that rely on evi-
dentiary showings on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, see Sinclair, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 132, 
134; Quixtar, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 1212–13, 1216; McMann, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 268; Best West-
ern Int’l, 2006 WL 2091695, at *4–5; Highfields Capital, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 970; Alvis Coatings, 
Inc., 2004 WL 2904405, at *3; SPX Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d at 978; Baxter, 2001 WL 34806203, 
at *12; Greenbaum, 845 N.Y.S.2d at 698–99; Reunion Indus., 80 Pa. D. & C.4th at 456; Polito, 
78 Pa. D. & C.4th at 341–42; In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d at 821. 
118 See Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579–80; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 459; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 
770–71. 
119 Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579–80; see also Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720–21; Dendrite, 775 
A.2d at 770–71. 
120 See Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457, 459; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 771. 
121 See supra notes 116–117. One court analogized unmasking subpoenas to warrant 
requests in criminal investigations, noting that an inquiry into the underlying claim serves 
a similar function as a probable cause hearing, namely ensuring that there is an adequate 
factual basis for justifying the court’s action. See Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579–80. An-
other court has described the inquiry as a “preliminary screening” of the claim. See Solers, 
977 A.2d at 951. 
122 See infra notes 123–137 and accompanying text. 
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in good faith;123 2) a showing that the claim could withstand a motion to 
dismiss;124 3) a showing that the claim could withstand a motion for 
summary judgment;125 or 4) a showing of prima facie evidence for all 
elements of the claim.126 Several courts additionally require the party 
seeking unmasking to set forth the exact alleged harmful speech.127 
Other courts have noted that under either a prima facie evidence or 
summary judgment standard, the party seeking unmasking would im-
plicitly need to set forth the exact alleged harmful speech.128 These evi-
dentiary burdens on plaintiffs, however, are frequently tempered by re-
quiring production of evidence only for elements of the claim within 
that party’s control or independent of speakers’ identities.129 
 Overall, the trend for unmasking standards in the survey is towards 
requiring either prima facie evidence or summary judgment show-
ings.130 This is in large part due to concerns that lower evidentiary bur-
                                                                                                                      
123 See AOL, 52 Va. Cir. at 37; cf. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (requiring a 
showing that the subpoena itself was brought in good faith in case where defendant sought 
to unmask non-party anonymous speaker as part of its defense, but not requiring any 
evaluation of the underlying claim). 
124 See Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579; see also Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760 (mentioning 
that the plaintiff must both establish that the cause of action could survive a motion to 
dismiss and produce prima facie evidence for each element of the claim sufficient to war-
rant unmasking). 
125 See Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 721; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460. 
126 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 256; Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245; Brodie, 966 
A.2d at 457; see also Solers, 977 A.2d at 954 (requiring a showing of evidence sufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact for each element of the claim, but noting that its 
standard was perhaps closest to a summary judgment standard); Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760 
(mentioning that a plaintiff must establish that his or her cause of action could withstand a 
motion to dismiss and set forth a prima facie cause of action sufficient to warrant disclo-
sure of the anonymous party’s identity). 
127 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 254 (“[I]dentif[y] and set forth the exact state-
ments purportedly made by each anonymous poster that . . . constitute[] actionable 
speech.”); Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457 (“[I]dentify and set forth the exact statements purport-
edly made by each anonymous poster, alleged to constitute actionable speech . . . .”); Den-
drite, 775 A.2d at 760 (“[I]dentify and set forth the exact statements purportedly made by 
each anonymous poster that . . . constitute[] actionable speech.”). 
128 See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461; Solers, 977 A.2d at 954–55; see also Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 
718–20 (endorsing the Cahill court’s summary judgment inquiry, and noting that it would 
require production of the exact alleged harmful speech). 
129 See Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 721; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460, 464; Solers, 977 A.2d at 954. 
130 The two earliest standards in this survey that examine the underlying claim use ei-
ther good faith or motion to dismiss standards. See Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579 (utiliz-
ing motion to dismiss standard in 1999); AOL, 52 Va. Cir. at 37 (using good faith standard 
in 2000); cf. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (requiring that the subpoena itself be 
issued in good faith in 2001). All later decisions utilize either a summary judgment or 
prima facie evidence inquiry, with two jurisdictions favoring summary judgment and five 
favoring a prima facie evidence inquiry. See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 256 (prima 
 
852 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:833 
dens like good faith and motion to dismiss standards are too easy for 
plaintiffs to satisfy and thus more likely to be misused for harassing or 
intimidating critics.131 Summary judgment and prima facie evidence 
standards are considered to be more rigorous evidentiary burdens for 
plaintiffs to satisfy, and thus more protective of anonymous speakers.132 
 Within the standards in the survey that utilize these higher eviden-
tiary burdens, five courts have selected prima facie evidence require-
ments while only two have implemented summary judgment inquir-
ies.133 Courts made this choice for two primary reasons.134 First, some 
consider summary judgment inquiries too burdensome for plaintiffs, 
finding that prima facie evidence requirements do a better job of bal-
ancing the rights of the parties involved.135 Second, other courts have 
rejected summary judgment prongs as potentially confusing and add-
                                                                                                                      
facie); Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 721 (summary judgment); Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245 
(prima facie); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460 (summary judgment); Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457 (prima 
facie); Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760 (prima facie); see also Solers, 977 A.2d at 954 (stating that its 
standard was most analogous to a summary judgment standard, but requiring evidence 
creating a genuine issue of material fact for each element of the claim). 
Unmasking cases outside this survey also trend towards either a summary judgment or 
some sort of prima facie evidence inquiry. See, e.g., Sinclair, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 132–34 (de-
clining to choose a standard, but finding insufficient evidence to support the plaintiff’s 
claims under either a Cahill or Dendrite unmasking standard); Quixtar, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 
1212–13, 1216 (summary judgment); McMann, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 267–68 (appearing to 
endorse a summary judgment standard but noting that the plaintiff simply failed to state a 
claim); Best Western Int’l, 2006 WL 2091695, at *4 (summary judgment); Highfields Capital, 
385 F. Supp. 2d at 970 (endorsing a showing of a “real evidentiary basis for believing that 
the defendant has engaged in wrongful conduct that has caused real harm”) (quotation 
omitted); Alvis Coatings, Inc., 2004 WL 2904405, at *3 (prima facie); Greenbaum, 845 
N.Y.S.2d at 698–99 (declining to define the quantum of proof required but finding alleged 
harmful statements inactionable as a matter of law); Reunion Indus., 80 Pa. D. & C.4th at 
456 (summary judgment); Polito, 78 Pa. D. & C.4th at 341–42 (prima facie); In re Does 1–10, 
242 S.W.3d at 821 (summary judgment). 
131 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 255–56; Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720; Krinsky, 72 
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244–45; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457–60; Solers, 977 A.2d at 952–54; Brodie, 966 
A.2d at 456–57; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760, 769–71. 
132 See supra note 131. 
133 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
134 See infra notes 135–136 and accompanying text. 
135 See Brodie, 966 A.2d at 456–57 (noting that a summary judgment prong would es-
sentially require plaintiffs to prove their cases before unmasking anonymous defendants); 
see also AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 255–56. But see Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720 (finding 
that a prima facie case standard would set the evidentiary bar too low for parties seeking 
unmasking); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457–60 (endorsing summary judgment standard after con-
sidering good faith, motion to dismiss, and prima facie evidence standards). 
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ing an unnecessary procedural label to the evidentiary inquiry.136 
Overall, courts are relatively evenly split on using a prima facie evidence 
or a summary judgment requirement for evaluating the merits of the 
plaintiff’s claim.137 
C. Need for the Identifying Information 
 In addition to a showing on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, most 
unmasking standards in this survey also require the court to consider 
the need the party seeking unmasking has for the identifying informa-
tion.138 Within these standards, however, need-based inquiries are de-
                                                                                                                      
136 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 255–56; Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244–45; see 
also Solers, 977 A.2d at 954 (noting that labels like summary judgment and prima facie evi-
dence may be confusing). 
137 See supra note 130. 
138 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 255 (requiring consideration of the specificity 
of the discovery request, whether there is an alternative means of obtaining the requested 
information, and whether there is a central need for the information); 2TheMart.com, 140 
F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (requiring consideration of whether the information relates to a core 
claim or defense, whether the information is directly and materially relevant to that claim 
or defense, and whether information sufficient to establish or disprove that claim or de-
fense is available from another source); Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579–80 (requiring a 
showing that the party has attempted to locate the anonymous party and requiring a filing 
justifying the specific discovery request and a limited number of persons on whom discov-
ery might be served); Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720–21 (requiring a balancing of competing 
interests between the anonymous defendant and plaintiff which may include, but is not 
limited to, consideration of the scope of the discovery request, the need for the speaker’s 
identity, and the availability of alternative sources); Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245 (sug-
gesting necessity for the anonymous speaker’s identity as a factor for its standard); Solers, 
977 A.2d at 954 (requiring a determination that the information sought is important to 
enable the plaintiff to proceed with the lawsuit); Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457 (requiring a bal-
ancing of the anonymous speaker’s First Amendment rights against the strength of the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case and necessity for dislosure of the speaker’s identity); Dendrite, 
775 A.2d at 760–61 (requiring a balancing of the of the anonymous speaker’s First 
Amendment rights against the strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case and necessity for 
dislosure of the speaker’s identity); AOL, 52 Va. Cir. at 37 (requiring that the speaker’s 
identity must be centrally needed to advance the plaintiff’s claim); see also infra app. Only 
one standard in the survey does not explicitly or implicitly consider the need for the iden-
tifying information as a factor in unmasking. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460–61 (considering 
and rejecting a balancing prong that would have included consideration of the necessity 
for disclosure of the defendant’s identity). Other unmasking standards outside the survey 
also incorporate showings of need. See, e.g., Best Western Int’l, 2006 WL 2091695, at *5 (find-
ing that plaintiff had demonstrated a central need for the subpoenaed information); High-
fields Capital, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (magistrate’s report attached to court opinion suggest-
ing that after requiring an evidentiary showing on the merits, the next step would be to 
balance the party’s interests, including consideration of the significance of the identifying 
information to the plaintiff’s case); Polito, 78 Pa. D. & C.4th at 341 (requiring a showing 
that the information is necessary for the plaintiff to pursue the claim and that it is unavail-
able from other sources). 
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fined many different ways, and often in different ways within the same 
standard.139 For example, courts may require consideration of: 1) 
whether there are alternate means of obtaining the information;140 2) 
the scope of the identifying request;141 3) whether there are valid rea-
sons justifying the unmasking request;142 4) whether the identifying in-
formation sought is relevant, material, or otherwise important to the 
lawsuit;143 and, more generally, 5) whether there is a need or necessity 
for unmasking.144 The Arizona Court of Appeals actually embraced all 
of these various need-based inquiries in its 2007 decision, Mobilisa, Inc. 
v. Doe 1, but subsumed them as implied within a different element of its 
unmasking standard.145 
 Although virtually all courts in the survey incorporate some sort of 
need-based inquiry within their unmasking standards, very few opin-
ions explain why these inquiries are important or how the individual 
types of inquiry were selected.146 Perhaps this is because the signifi-
cance of various need-based inquiries are self-evident: if a plaintiff does 
not need the identifying information to proceed with his or her claim, 
if the information is available from another source, if the scope of the 
identifying request is too broad, or if there is not a good reason for al-
lowing identification, then a court should not allow its unmasking 
power to be used to potentially violate the First Amendment rights of 
anonymous speakers.147 Regardless, courts generally recognize that an 
inquiry on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim by itself is not sufficient to 
protect anonymous speakers, and that some sort of additional inquiry 
into the necessity of unmasking is required.148 
                                                                                                                      
139 See infra notes 140–145 and accompanying text. 
140 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 255; 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1095; 
Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579. But see Solers, 977 A.2d at 954 (specifically rejecting requir-
ing a showing that no alternative means were available). 
141 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 255; Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579, 580. 
142 See Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 580. 
143 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 255; 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1095; 
Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245; Solers, 977 A.2d at 954; AOL, 52 Va. Cir. at 37. 
144 See Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–61. 
145 See 170 P.3d at 720–21 (requiring a balancing of competing interests between the 
anonymous defendant and plaintiff including considerations of need for the identifying 
information, the scope of the discovery request, and the availability of alternative sources). 
146 See supra note 138. 
147 See supra notes 138–145 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra notes 138. 
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D. First Amendment Balancing of the Right to Speak Anonymously 
 Most courts in this survey agree that plaintiffs must make an evi-
dentiary showing on the merits of the claim and demonstrate a need for 
the anonymous defendant’s identifying information.149 There is consid-
erably less agreement, however, about other elements in unmasking 
standards.150 For example, only one standard in the survey requires a 
court to consider the anonymous speaker’s expectation of privacy.151 
Similarly, only one standard explicitly requires that the court determine 
that the claim has been adequately pleaded.152 But by far the most divi-
sive issue in unmasking standards is whether an additional First Amend-
ment “balancing” prong is needed to fully protect the rights of anony-
mous speakers.153 
 Standards that incorporate First Amendment balancing prongs 
typically operate this way: first, the plaintiff must demonstrate attempts 
to provide notice to the anonymous speaker and must make an eviden-
tiary showing on the merits of the claim.154 Then, the court must bal-
ance the defendant’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously 
against the strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case and the necessity 
for disclosing the anonymous speaker’s identity.155 
 Only a minority of unmasking standards within the survey incor-
porate balancing prongs, and there is a pronounced split within these 
                                                                                                                      
149 See supra notes 116–148 and accompanying text. 
150 See infra notes 151–180 and accompanying text. 
151 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 255; see also Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720–21 (sug-
gesting expectation of privacy as an issue that could be considered within its standard). 
Consideration of speakers’ expectations of privacy is found in only a few anonymous 
speech unmasking decisions. See, e.g., Best Western Int’l, 2006 WL 2091695, at *5. 
152 See Solers, 977 A.2d at 954. 
153 See infra notes 154–180 and accompanying text. 
154 See Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 721; Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760. Some 
standards also require that the plaintiff set forth the exact alleged harmful statements. See 
Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760; see also supra notes 127–128 and accom-
panying text. 
155 See Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–61; see also Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 
720–21. For standards that contain First Amendment balancing prongs, the inquiry into 
the need for the identifying information is typically incorporated within that balancing 
prong. See Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–61; see also Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 
720–21 (inquiry into the necessity of unmasking implied within the final balancing prong, 
which is phrased as requiring a finding that “a balance of the parties’ competing interests 
favors disclosure”). For standards that do not use a balancing prong, the need inquiry 
typically comprises one or more stand-alone elements of the standard. See supra note 138; 
see also infra app. 
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cases regarding the value and importance of balancing prongs.156 
Within the broader context of unmasking opinions outside the survey, 
balancing prongs are found in an acute minority of cases.157 
 The separate balancing prong originated in the 2001 Superior 
Court of New Jersey decision, Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3.158 
In addition to requiring notice and a prima facie showing of the claim, 
the Dendrite court’s unmasking standard further required a balancing of 
the defendant’s right to speak anonymously against the strength of the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case and the necessity for disclosure of the 
anonymous defendant’s identity.159 As justification for this balancing 
prong, the Dendrite court stated that evaluating plaintiffs’ claims “in iso-
lation” was insufficient to fully balance plaintiffs’ interests against de-
fendants’ First Amendment rights, but it gave little indication of how 
the balancing prong might be implemented.160 Indeed, the court’s ul-
timate decision in Dendrite, affirming the motion to quash the unmask-
ing subpoena, was predicated primarily on the fact that the corporate 
                                                                                                                      
156 Overall, three standards in the survey contain balancing prongs, while seven do 
not. See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 254–56 (no balancing prong); 2TheMart.com, 140 
F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (no balancing prong); Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 578–80 (no balanc-
ing prong); Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 721 (balancing prong); Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244–46 
(no balancing prong); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460–61 (no balancing prong); Solers, 977 A.2d at 
954 (no balancing prong); Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457 (balancing prong); Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 
760–61 (balancing prong); AOL, 52 Va. Cir. at 37 (no balancing prong). But since balanc-
ing prongs first appeared in 2001, three courts in the survey have implemented balancing 
prongs while four have rejected them. In chronological order, see Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 
756, 760–61 (decided in 2001 and implementing the first balancing prong); Cahill, 884 
A.2d at 451, 460–61 (decided in 2005 and no balancing prong); Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 712, 
721 (decided in 2007 and containing balancing prong); Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 231, 
244–46 (decided in 2008 and no balancing prong); AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 249, 
254–56 (decided in 2008 and no balancing prong); Brodie, 966 A.2d at 432, 457 (decided 
in 2009 and containing balancing prong); Solers, 977 A.2d at 941, 954 (decided in 2009 
and no balancing prong). See also infra notes 158–180 and accompanying text. 
157 See, e.g., Highfields Capital, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 970–71, 980 (indicating in a magistrate 
report attached to district court opinion that a balancing step would be used except that 
party did not satisfy the showing on the merits of the claim). One possible reason for this is 
that many unmasking cases are decided after considering the evidentiary showing on the 
merits of the claim alone, and the court never has to consider whether a First Amendment 
balancing prong would be needed. See, e.g., Sinclair, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 132–134 (citing 
unmasking standards with and without balancing prongs as the prominent unmasking 
standards, but declining to choose between them in part because the plaintiff’s evidentiary 
showing did not satisfy either); Greenbaum, 845 N.Y.S.2d at 698–99 (endorsing factors from 
an unmasking standard which contains a balancing prong, but determining that the al-
leged harmful statements were inactionable as a matter of law). 
158 775 A.2d at 760–61. 
159 See id. The Dendrite opinion also referred to its examination of the plaintiff’s claim 
as a “motion to dismiss” standard. See id. at 760, 770. 
160 See id. at 770–72. 
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plaintiff did not make an adequate showing of its defamation claim.161 
The court did note, however, that its unmasking standard was intended 
to be a “flexible, non-technical, fact-sensitive mechanism,” ensuring 
that plaintiffs did not abuse discovery procedures to harass or silence 
their critics.162 
 Since Dendrite, two additional courts in the survey have imple-
mented First Amendment balancing prongs in their unmasking stan-
dards: the Arizona Court of Appeals in the 2007 decision, Mobilisa, Inc. 
v. Doe 1, and the Supreme Court of Maryland in its 2009 decision, Inde-
pendent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie.163 Like the Dendrite court, the Brodie 
court gave little explanation for why it adopted its balancing prong, and 
its final decision upholding a motion to quash an unmasking subpoena 
again appeared to be predicated on the weakness of the plaintiff’s 
claims.164 The Mobilisa court, however, was more expansive in explain-
ing why it implemented a balancing prong.165 
 The Mobilisa court stated that in addition to requiring plaintiffs to 
provide notice and a showing on the merits of the claim, a further bal-
ancing of the parties’ interests was “necessary to achieve appropriate 
rulings in the vast array of factually distinct cases likely to involve 
anonymous speech.”166 The court mentioned various need-based con-
siderations that might weigh against plaintiffs’ interests, but it also 
pointed out that there could be numerous First Amendment considera-
tions weighing against disclosure of anonymous speakers’ identities as 
well, including: the type of speech involved, the speaker’s expectation 
                                                                                                                      
161 See id. at 771–72. 
162 Id. at 771. 
163 See Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720–21; Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457. In Mobilisa, corporate plain-
tiff Mobilisa Inc. (“Mobilisa”) sought to unmask anonymous defendants who had obtained 
and retransmitted an intimate email written by the company’s president on claims includ-
ing trespass to chattel and violation of federal electronic communications laws. See 170 P.3d 
at 715–16. The email was forwarded by the anonymous defendant(s) to an unknown list of 
people that included members of Mobilisa’s management, along with the comment: “Is 
this a company you want to work for?” Id. at 715 (quotation omitted). Mobilisa sought to 
compel The Suggestion Box, Inc., the company that maintained the website where the 
retransmitted email originated, to disclose the identity of the person who had sent the 
email. Id. at 715–16. In Brodie, a local businessman sought the identity of three anonymous 
defendants who posted comments about him and a local developer on a newspaper web-
site forum. See 966 A.2d at 442–47. The businessman sued for defamation and conspiracy 
to defame after the posters criticized him for selling a piece of historic property that later 
burned in a fire, and also made critical comments about sanitation at food establishments 
that he owned. See id. 
164 See Brodie, 966 A.2d at 447–49, 456–57. 
165 See 170 P.3d at 720–21. 
166 See id. at 720. 
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of privacy, and “the potential consequence of a discovery order to the 
speaker and others similarly situated.”167 Only by giving courts the 
flexibility to examine these, and a “myriad of other potential factors,” 
would courts be able to do justice to both plaintiffs and anonymous 
speakers on a case-by-case basis.168 
 Use of a First Amendment balancing prong in unmasking stan-
dards has been heavily criticized, however.169 Three courts in the survey 
have declined to adopt balancing prongs in their unmasking standards 
since the Dendrite decision, and balancing prongs were the subject of 
extensive criticism by concurring justices in Brodie and the dissenting 
judge in Mobilisa.170 
 The first major criticism of First Amendment balancing prongs 
appeared in the Supreme Court of Delaware’s 2005 decision, Doe No. 1 
v. Cahill.171 In formulating its own unmasking standard, the Cahill court 
adopted a notice provision and a summary judgment test for evaluating 
the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, but explicitly rejected the balancing 
prong from the Dendrite standard.172 For the Cahill court, the summary 
judgment showing was the sole factor needed to adequately balance the 
rights of anonymous defendants against plaintiffs’ interests.173 The 
court felt that a First Amendment balancing prong was superfluous and 
redundant, noting that it “add[ed] no protection beyond that of the 
summary judgment test and needlessly complicate[d]” the court’s 
analysis.174 Analyzing the defamation claim at hand, the Cahill court 
                                                                                                                      
167 See id. 
168 See id. Like the Dendrite and Brodie courts, the Mobilisa court did not appear to put 
its balancing prong into action, instead remanding the case to the trial court for further 
consideration. See id. at 723–24. 
169 See infra notes 170–180 and accompanying text. 
170 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 254–56; Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 724–27 (Barker, 
J., dissenting); Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245–46; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461; Solers, 977 A.2d at 
954; Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457–59 (Adkins, J., concurring). 
171 See 884 A.2d at 461. In Cahill, a local politician sought to unmask an unknown de-
fendant for posting allegedly defamatory comments about him on an internet blog spon-
sored by the Delaware State News. Id. at 454. The postings criticized the politician for be-
ing “a divisive impediment to any kind of cooperative movement” in revitalizing the town, 
and stated things like “[a]nyone who has spent any amount of time with Cahill would be 
keenly aware of [his] character flaws, not to mention an obvious mental deterioration,” 
and “Gahill [sic] is as paranoid as everyone in this town thinks he is.” Id. (emphasis omit-
ted). 
172 See id. at 460–61. The Cahill court equated its summary judgment test with the Den-
drite prima facie evidence requirement and rejected both aspects of the Dendrite balancing 
prong, which included consideration of both the anonymous speaker’s First Amendment 
rights and the need for disclosure. See id. 
173 See id. at 461. 
174 See id. 
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further noted that its summary judgment inquiry would allow consid-
eration of First Amendment issues like the context and content of the 
speech, and would allow courts to invoke protective doctrines like opin-
ion privilege as well.175 
 Other courts in the survey have come to similar conclusions about 
separate balancing prongs.176 The main criticisms are: 1) that separate 
balancing tests are superfluous and needlessly complicate the analysis 
because the inquiry on the merits of the claim fully conducts the balanc-
ing of interests,177 and 2) that once a plaintiff demonstrates that he or 
she has a legitimate claim, a further balancing of interests is an uncon-
stitutional restriction on the plaintiff’s right to seek redress.178 There is 
some tension between these criticisms, as the former suggests that bal-
ancing prongs offer no additional protection for anonymous defen-
dants, while the other implies that balancing prongs present extra pro-
tections.179 Nevertheless, the dominant view among unmasking stan-
dards is that First Amendment balancing prongs are unnecessary or 
undesirable as only a minority of jurisdictions have explicitly adopted 
them.180 
IV. A Proposed Unmasking Standard 
 If most courts have now embraced either unmasking standards, or 
at least specific criteria that parties seeking to unmask anonymous 
speakers must satisfy, one key question remains: what would an ideal 
unmasking standard look like? This Part argues that an ideal unmasking 
standard would require a party seeking unmasking to: 1) provide the 
anonymous speaker adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to 
                                                                                                                      
175 See id. at 465–66. 
176 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 254–56 (formulating its standard after the 
Dendrite decision and citing to the Dendrite case within its opinion, but neglecting to in-
clude a balancing prong in its standard); Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245–46; Solers, 977 
A.2d at 954, 956; see also Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 724–27 (Barker, J. dissenting); Brodie, 966 
A.2d at 457–59 (Adkins, J., concurring). 
177 See Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245–46; Solers, 977 A.2d at 954, 956; see also Cahill, 884 
A.2d at 461. 
178 See Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 725–27 (Barker, J., dissenting); Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457–59 
(Adkins, J., concurring). 
179 See, e.g., Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 725 (Barker, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority’s 
standard, which included a balancing prong, as a “summary judgment-plus standard”); 
Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461 (A balancing prong “adds no protection above and beyond that of 
the summary judgment test and needlessly complicates the analysis.”); see also supra notes 
177–178. 
180 See Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 721; Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–61; see 
also supra notes 156–157 and accompanying text. 
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respond, and 2) make a prima facie evidence showing for all elements 
of the claim within the party’s control.181 If these showings are satisfied, 
the court should then balance the speaker’s First Amendment right to 
remain anonymous against the strength of the prima facie case and the 
need for the identifying information before permitting unmasking.182 
A. Notice 
 The ideal standard should first require parties seeking unmasking 
to show that they provided the anonymous speakers with adequate no-
tice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.183 Most courts that have 
formulated unmasking standards contain a notice provision.184 These 
courts have recognized the need to protect anonymous speakers from 
ex parte requests to discover their identities for both constitutional and 
practical reasons.185 At the same time, attempting to provide notice to 
anonymous parties in the unusual context of the internet requires a 
tempering of this requirement so as to not unduly burden plaintiffs.186 
Adequate notice can typically be satisfied by posting notice of the law-
suit and the unmasking subpoena to the forum, website, or email ad-
dress where the alleged harmful speech originated.187 
B. Prima Facie Evidence of the Claim 
 In addition to notice, the ideal unmasking standard should require 
the party seeking the identity of an anonymous speaker to make a 
prima facie evidentiary showing for all elements of the cause of action 
within that party’s control.188 Such a showing typically will require set-
ting forth the exact alleged harmful speech.189 
                                                                                                                      
181 See infra notes 183–200 and accompanying text. 
182 See infra notes 201–220 and accompanying text. 
183 See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); see also supra 
notes 108–110. 
184 See supra notes 108–110; see also infra app. 
185 See supra notes 112–114. 
186 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
187 See, e.g., Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005); see also supra note 110. 
188 See Doe I v. Individuals (AutoAdmit.com), 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 256 (D. Conn. 2008); 
Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 245 (Ct. App. 2008); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 457 (Md. 2009); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); see also Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 
573, 579–80 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 721; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460; Solers, Inc. 
v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 954 (D.C. 2009); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc. 
(AOL), 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Cir. Ct. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom, Am. Online, Inc. v. 
Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001). 
189 See supra notes 127–128. 
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 Virtually all courts that have considered unmasking requests re-
quire some evidentiary showing on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.190 
Indeed, this is the primary factor used by most courts to balance the 
rights of anonymous speakers against the rights of plaintiffs to seek re-
dress for harmful speech.191 As courts have noted, an evidentiary show-
ing on the merits of the claim ensures that there is a legitimate factual 
basis for allowing both the litigation and the unmasking subpoena to 
go forward, and it reduces the risk of abuse of the litigation process to 
harass, intimidate, or silence critics.192 
 Most courts now use either a summary judgment or prima facie 
evidence inquiry to evaluate the merits of the claim as opposed to good 
faith or motion to dismiss standards.193 A prima facie evidence require-
ment is preferable for a variety of reasons.194 Lower threshold inquiries 
like good faith basis or motion to dismiss standards are too easy for 
plaintiffs to satisfy, thus risking misuse of litigation and the discovery 
process to silence anonymous speakers.195 Conversely, a summary judg-
ment standard may set the bar too high, applying a level of scrutiny that 
would typically not be required until the end of discovery.196 A prima 
facie evidence inquiry is the appropriate standard, essentially requiring 
a production of evidence for all elements of the cause of action within 
the plaintiff’s control sufficient to ensure that there is a legitimate 
claim.197 This showing will typically require setting forth the exact al-
leged harmful speech itself, the context in which the speech took place, 
and a demonstrable harm, thus developing the record and allowing 
courts to make informed decisions as to whether to allow the unmasking 
subpoena and litigation to proceed.198 This is the type of evidence that a 
plaintiff typically will have during discovery, and therefore it does not 
present an undue burden for plaintiffs.199 The prima facie evidence 
standard also has the advantage of avoiding a potentially confusing and 
                                                                                                                      
190 See supra notes 116–117; see also infra app. 
191 See supra notes 116–117. 
192 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 256; Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245; Cahill, 884 
A.2d at 457; see also supra notes 116–121 and accompanying text. 
193 See supra note 130. 
194 See infra notes 195–200 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra note 131. 
196 See, e.g., Brodie, 966 A.2d at 456–57; see also supra note 135. 
197 See, e.g., AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 256; Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245; Bro-
die, 966 A.2d at 457; see also supra note 116–117. 
198 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 254–57; Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245–50; 
Brodie, 966 A.2d at 442–49, 456–57; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–64, 770–72; see also Mobilisa, 
170 P.3d at 720–23; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460–67; Solers, 977 A.2d at 954–55, 957–59. 
199 See supra note 198. 
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unnecessary procedural label for what should essentially be a straight-
forward evidentiary showing on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.200 
C. Balancing of the First Amendment Right to Speak Anonymously Against the 
Strength of the Claim and the Need for Unmasking 
 Once a party seeking unmasking has satisfied these threshold is-
sues of notice and a prima facie evidentiary showing on the merits of 
the claim, the court should then balance the defendant’s First 
Amendment right to speak anonymously against the strength of the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case and the need for unmasking.201 Although 
this type of balancing prong is found in only a minority of unmasking 
standards,202 it is needed to fully protect anonymous speakers in all of 
the procedural contexts and causes of action under which unmasking 
requests arise.203 The key components of this balancing prong relate to 
consideration of the need for the identifying information and the 
speaker’s First Amendment right to remain anonymous.204 
 First, most unmasking standards contain some consideration of 
whether the party seeking unmasking has a verifiable need for the par-
ticular identifying information sought.205 By including need-based in-
quiries within unmasking standards, courts have recognized that there 
may be times when a plaintiff can make a legitimate evidentiary showing 
on the merits of a claim, and yet still lack sufficient need to invoke the 
power of the court to unmask an anonymous speaker.206 This may be for 
a variety of reasons, including but not limited to whether the scope of 
the identifying request is too broad, the identifying information is ir-
relevant, the identifying information can be obtained through other 
means, or the case can proceed without the identifying information.207 
In such cases, there is no legitimate reason for the court to use its power 
to unmask an anonymous speaker, particularly when doing so may lead 
to harassment, intimidation, or silencing of speakers who have done 
nothing wrong.208 A balancing prong that gives the court broad author-
                                                                                                                      
200 See AutoAdmit.com, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 255–56; Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244–45; 
Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457; see also Solers, 977 A.2d at 954. 
201 See Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720–21; Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–61. 
202 See supra notes 156–157. 
203 See supra notes 53–72. 
204 See infra notes 205–220 and accompanying text. 
205 See supra note 138; see also infra app. 
206 See supra note 138. 
207 See supra notes 140–145. 
208 See supra notes 140–145. 
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ity to consider the need for the particular identifying information 
sought is thus an important protection for anonymous speakers.209 
 The second important component of the balancing prong is con-
sideration of the speaker’s First Amendment right to remain anony-
mous.210 Some courts have rejected this consideration as superfluous or 
an extra burden on plaintiffs.211 But explicit consideration of the 
speaker’s right to anonymity is important because unmasking requests 
arise in a wide variety of contexts and under many different causes of 
action, including defamation, trespass to chattel, trademark, and trade 
secret violations.212 Although an inquiry on the merits of the claim will 
include some consideration of First Amendment issues for speech-
related causes of action like defamation, it may not for others like trade 
secret violations or trespass to chattel.213 A First Amendment balancing 
prong ensures that courts will consider factors like the type of speech 
involved, the context where the speech occurred, and protective doc-
trines like opinion speech, thus promoting uniformity of decision-
making and guaranteeing that plaintiffs cannot sidestep the protections 
of the First Amendment simply by engaging in creative pleading.214 
Further, this weighing of the defendant’s First Amendment right to re-
main anonymous does not impose any additional evidentiary burden 
on the plaintiff, but instead is merely a factor to be taken into consid-
eration by the court.215 
                                                                                                                      
209 See Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720–21; Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–61. 
210 See supra note 209. 
211 See supra notes 174–178. 
212 See supra notes 53–72. 
213 See, e.g., Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 715–16, 720–24 (defendant sued for trespass to chattel 
and federal statutory claims); see also Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. 
Supp. 2d 1205, 1206 (D. Nev. 2008) (defendant sued for Lanham Act violations, trade 
secret misappropriation, and tortious interference with contracts and business relations). 
214 See Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720–21; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–61, 770–71; see also supra 
notes 53–72 and accompanying text. For discussion of various First Amendment considera-
tions in anonymous speech cases, see Lidsky, supra note 8, at 932–46 (arguing for adapting 
opinion privilege for use in anonymous speech cases); Ryan M. Martin, Note, Freezing the 
Net: Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-All Standard for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers in Defama-
tion Lawsuits, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1217, 1240–44 (2007) (arguing for different unmasking 
standards based on various types of speech involved, including political and non-political 
speech). 
215 See Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720–21; Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–
61. None of the courts that have adopted First Amendment balancing prongs in their un-
masking standards have needed to use them in coming to their decisions. See Brodie, 966 
A.2d at 447–49, 457; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 770–72; see also Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 722–24 (re-
manding for further consideration of the balancing prong). 
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 First Amendment balancing prongs are also important because 
they require courts to consider each case holistically with a flexible, 
fact-specific approach.216 The goal of unmasking standards is to appro-
priately balance the rights of anonymous speakers against the rights of 
plaintiffs to seek redress for harmful speech.217 By balancing First 
Amendment considerations against the strength of the prima facie case 
and the need for unmasking, courts may consider the content and con-
text of the speech, the need for the identifying information, the harm 
caused by the speech, the remedies sought by the party seeking un-
masking, and the potential harms that unmasking would pose to the 
anonymous speaker and others similarly situated.218 These considera-
tions pose no additional burden on parties seeking unmasking beyond 
demonstrating the merits of the claim, but are essential for courts to 
consider all aspects of each case in a “flexible, non-technical, fact-
sensitive” manner.219 Only by weighing all of these various factors to-
gether can a court adequately determine whether unmasking is war-
ranted and ensure that the identifying subpoena is not being used to 
intimidate or silence critics.220 
Conclusion 
 Unmasking anonymous internet speakers remains a critical issue 
for both plaintiffs and defendants.  On the one hand, unmasking  sub-
poenas jeopardize the right to speak anonymously, potentially subject-
ing speakers who have done nothing wrong to harassment or retribu-
tion. On the other hand, unmasking subpoenas are also frequently the 
only means for aggrieved parties to pursue redress for harms caused by 
anonymous internet speech. 
 Courts confronted with unmasking requests have concluded that 
such requests require a balancing of the First Amendment rights of 
anonymous speakers against the right to seek redress for allegedly 
harmful speech. They have responded primarily by creating standards 
that the party seeking unmasking must satisfy in order to compel disclo-
sure of the anonymous speaker’s identity. There is little uniformity in 
                                                                                                                      
216 See Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 770–71; see also Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720–21; Brodie, 966 A.2d 
at 457. 
217 See supra note 88. 
218 See Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720–21; Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–
61; see also supra notes 116–180 and accompanying text. 
219 Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 771; see also supra notes 116–180. 
220 See Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720–21; Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–
61; see also supra notes 116–180 and accompanying text. 
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unmasking standards, however, leading to uncertainty for both plaintiffs 
and defendants. 
 Courts considering unmasking requests should move towards a 
unified standard that reflects the accumulated wisdom of courts that 
have already considered the matter. An ideal standard would require 
parties seeking unmasking to: 1) provide adequate notice and a rea-
sonable opportunity to respond to the anonymous speaker; 2) make a 
prima facie showing of the evidence for all elements of the claim within 
the plaintiff’s control; and 3) balance the speaker’s First Amendment 
rights against the strength of the prima facie case and the need for 
unmasking. This standard would allow courts to evaluate unmasking 
requests in a flexible, fact-sensitive manner, incorporating factors that 
are relevant to each individual case as it arises. In short, such a standard 
would ensure that anonymous internet speakers will be shielded from 
tyranny at the hands of unmasking subpoenas, while simultaneously 
ensuring that anonymous speakers cannot tyrannize others with the 
click of a button. 
Matthew Mazzotta 
866 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:833 
Appendix of Unmasking Standards 
Doe I v. Individuals (AutoAdmit.com), 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254–56 (D. 
Conn. 2008). 
[T]he [c]ourt should consider [(1)] whether the plaintiff has 
undertaken efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they 
are the subject of a subpoena and withheld action to afford 
the fictitiously named defendants a reasonable opportunity to 
file and serve opposition to the application. . . . [(2) 
W]hether the plaintiff has identified and set forth the exact 
statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster that 
the plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable speech. . . . [(3) 
T]he specificity of the discovery request and whether there is 
an alternative means of obtaining the information called for 
in the subpoena. . . . [(4) W]hether there is a central need for 
the subpoenaed information to advance the plaintiffs’ 
claims. . . . [(5) T]he subpoenaed party’s expectation of pri-
vacy at the time the online material was posted. . . . [And (6)] 
whether the plaintiffs have made . . . a concrete showing as to 
each element of a prima facie case against the defendant. 
Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 
2001). 
The Court will consider . . . whether: (1) the subpoena seek-
ing the information was issued in good faith and not for any 
improper purpose, (2) the information sought relates to a 
core claim or defense, (3) the identifying information is di-
rectly and materially relevant to that claim or defense, and (4) 
information sufficient to establish or to disprove that claim or 
defense is unavailable from any other source. 
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578–80 (N.D. Cal. 
1999). 
First, the plaintiff should identify the missing party with suffi-
cient specificity such that the Court can determine that de-
fendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal 
court. . . . Second, the party should identify all previous steps 
taken to locate the elusive defendant. . . . Third, plaintiff 
should establish to the Court’s satisfaction that plaintiff’s suit 
against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss. . . . 
Lastly, the plaintiff should file a request for discovery with the 
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Court, along with a statement of reasons justifying the specific 
discovery requested as well as identification of a limited num-
ber of persons or entities on whom discovery process might 
be served and for which there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the discovery process will lead to identifying information 
about defendant that would make service of process possible. 
Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 720–21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
[T]he requesting party must show: (1) the speaker has been 
given adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to re-
spond to the discovery request, (2) the requesting party’s 
cause of action could survive a motion for summary judgment 
on elements not dependent on the speaker’s identity, and (3) 
a balance of the parties’ competing interests favors disclosure 
[including the need for the identifying information and First 
Amendment concerns]. 
Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244–45 (Ct. App. 2008). 
[Requiring that the plaintiff demonstrate: (1)] an attempt to 
notify the defendant . . . [and (2)] a prima facie showing of 
the elements [of the claim such that] it is clear to the court 
that discovery of the defendant’s identity is necessary to pur-
sue the plaintiff’s claim . . . . 
Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460–61 (Del. 2005). 
[Requiring the plaintiff to: (1)] support [the claim] with facts 
sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion . . . [and (2)] 
undertake efforts to notify the anonymous poster that he is 
the subject of a subpoena or application for order of disclo-
sure [and] withhold action to afford the anonymous defen-
dant a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to 
the discovery request. 
Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 954 (D.C. 2009). 
[T]he court should: (1) ensure that the plaintiff has ade-
quately pleaded the elements of the [] claim, (2) require rea-
sonable efforts to notify the anonymous defendant that the 
complaint has been filed and the subpoena has been served, 
(3) delay further action for a reasonable time to allow the de-
fendant an opportunity to file a motion to quash, (4) require 
the plaintiff to proffer evidence creating a genuine issue of 
material fact on each element of the claim that is within its con-
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trol, and (5) determine that the information sought is impor-
tant to enable the plaintiff to proceed with his lawsuit. 
Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 457 (Md. 2009). 
[The court] should, (1) require the plaintiff to undertake ef-
forts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject 
of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, in-
cluding posting a message of notification of the identity dis-
covery request on the message board; (2) withhold action to 
afford the anonymous posters a reasonable opportunity to file 
and serve opposition to the application; (3) require the plain-
tiff to identify and set forth the exact statements purportedly 
made by each anonymous poster, alleged to constitute action-
able speech; (4) determine whether the complaint has set 
forth a prima facie [cause of] action against the anonymous 
posters; and (5), if all else is satisfied, balance the anonymous 
poster’s First Amendment right of free speech against the 
strength of the prima facie case [] presented by the plaintiff and 
the necessity for disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s 
identity . . . . 
Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001). 
[The] court should [(1)] require the plaintiff to undertake 
efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the sub-
ject of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, 
and withhold action to afford the fictitiously-named defen-
dants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to 
the application . . . [(2)] require the plaintiff to identify and 
set forth the exact statements purportedly made by each 
anonymous poster that plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable 
speech . . . [(3)] determine whether [the] plaintiff has set 
forth a prima facie cause of action against the fictitiously-
named anonymous defendants [including both] establishing 
that its cause of action can withstand a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted [and] 
produc[ing] sufficient evidence supporting each element of 
its cause of action, on a prima facie basis . . . [and (4)] bal-
ance the defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous 
free speech against the strength of the prima facie case pre-
sented and the necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous 
defendant’s identity . . . . 
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In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc. (AOL), 52 Va. Cir. 26, 
37 (Cir. Ct. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom, Am. Online, Inc. v. 
Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001). 
[The court should compel disclosure] (1) when the court is 
satisfied by the pleadings or evidence supplied to that court 
(2) that the party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, 
good faith basis to contend that it may be the victim of con-
duct actionable in the jurisdiction where suit was filed and (3) 
the subpoenaed identity information is centrally needed to 
advance that claim. 
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